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In this paper we investigate the effects of consumer discrimination on the employment and earnings
of minorities, particularly blacks. We do so using data from a new survey of employers in four large
metropolitan areas in the United States. Our results show that the racial composition of an establishment’s
customers has sizable effects on the race of who gets hired, particularly in jobs that involve direct contact
with customers. Although we find evidence of customer discrimination in both predominantly white and
black establishments, the net effect of such discrimination appears to be some reduction in overall labor
demand and wages for blacks. Evidence is also presented which suggests that the role of customer
discrimination may be growing more important over time.Neal and Johnson (1996), among others, find that much of the racial gap in hourly earnings disappears
1
when they control for differences in Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) scores. But Rodgers and Spriggs
(1996) and Cawley et al. (1996) show that different components of the AFQT are rewarded among whites quite
differently than among blacks, raising questions about whether such returns are really race-neutral measures of
skill. Also, a much smaller part of the racial difference in employment rates than wage rates is eliminated by this
control.
Evidence that employer discrimination is greater in the suburbs than in the central city is provided by
2
Holzer (1996b). He shows that, for blacks, the ratio of new hires to job applicants is significantly lower in suburban
than central-city establishments, even though skill needs in the former are generally lower and the relative skills of
black applicants there are likely higher. The sources of prejudice underlying the discrimination, however, are not
identified. Other causes of the continuing “spatial mismatch” might include transportation difficulties of inner-city
blacks and/or information limitations (Holzer, Ihlanfeldt, and Sjoquist 1994; Ihlanfeldt 1996).
Customer Discrimination and Employment Outcomes
for Minority Workers
I. INTRODUCTION
Empirical studies generally show that, even after controlling for individual productivity
characteristics such as education and experience, blacks have lower levels of employment and earnings than
whites. The residual earnings gap between races is commonly attributed to labor market discrimination.
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Becker (1971) has identified three possible sources of this discrimination: the prejudice of
employers, workers, and consumers. In his model, employer and coworker discrimination will not persist
over time in competitive labor markets; some economists (e.g., Nardinelli and Simon 1990) therefore
conclude that any labor market discrimination that does persist most likely results from consumer
prejudice.
In addition to its possible importance in explaining the residual gaps in employment and earnings
between blacks and whites, the possible presence of consumer discrimination in the labor market is of
interest for at least two related reasons. First, there is considerable evidence that blacks have been
disadvantaged by job suburbanization (for a review of this evidence, see Holzer 1991; Ihlanfeldt 1992; or
Kain 1992). However, the reasons for this remain somewhat speculative. Kain (1968) has suggested that
consumer discrimination may account for the failure of inner-city blacks to follow jobs to the suburbs.
22
Evidence of consumer discrimination in the housing market is reviewed by Yinger (1995).
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Second, declining employment in manufacturing and the growth in services employment may have
increased the proportion of jobs requiring face-to-face contact with consumers. If consumer discrimination
exists, growth in consumer contact may help to explain recent relative declines in the relative earnings and
employment of blacks (e.g., Bound and Freeman 1992).
This paper provides some new evidence on consumer discrimination in the labor market obtained
from a unique new survey of employers. In contrast to previous work, the data allow a more direct
examination of the issue across a more representative sample of firms and newly filled jobs. Effects on both
wages and employment are provided, and some indirect evidence is provided of the possible effects of
customer discrimination on trends over time in the relative employment and earnings of minorities.
Before presenting the evidence, we briefly review the previous literature on this notion and present
a model of how consumer discrimination might affect the hiring of minorities.
II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Several previous studies have provided evidence on consumer discrimination in the labor market.
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Kahn and Sherer (1988) find a 20 percent wage gap between black and white professional basketball
players, controlling for a variety of productivity and market-related variables and for the endogeneity of
player draft position. They also find a strong positive relationship between home attendance and the
proportion of team members who are white. They conclude that the compensation and attendance results
together are consistent with the idea of consumer discrimination. Nardinelli and Simon (1990) find that the
baseball cards of white players command a higher price than those of black players, controlling for career
performance. They conclude that their evidence supports the hypothesis of consumer discrimination, since
in contrast to studies that use salaries, there is no room for owner or coworker discrimination.3
  Somewhat more general but also more indirect evidence of consumer discrimination appears in
Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1991). They find that the racial composition of the subcounty areas defined for the
1980 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) affects the occupations held by blacks who work in these
areas. As the percentage of the population that is black increases, both male and female blacks have a
lower likelihood of being employed in blue-collar occupations and a greater likelihood of employment in
white-collar occupations, controlling for the worker’s education and experience. Since white-collar
occupations involve, on average, more interaction with customers than blue-collar occupations, Ihlanfeldt
and Sjoquist concluded that their results are consistent with consumer discrimination.
Ihlanfeldt and Young (1994) find that the wages of black fast-food restaurant workers vary with
the percentage of customers who are white, holding constant a range of variables describing the individual
and the establishment. The effect, while statistically significant, is small in magnitude: a 10 percentage
point increase in the percentage of customers who are white reduces wages by 1 percent.
Although all of the above studies suggest that consumer discrimination against blacks exists,
Kenney and Wissoker’s (1994) analysis of hiring audit data provides no evidence that consumer
discrimination exists against Hispanics. They find that the treatment of Hispanic versus white auditors is
not influenced by the racial composition of the neighborhood where the firm is located. On the other hand,
an audit study by Neumark (1996) finds that females are less likely than males to be hired at high-price
restaurants.
To summarize the above evidence on consumer discrimination, it has been either fragmentary
(based on very specific industry and occupational categories) or quite indirect.4
If racial tastes vary among consumers, the least prejudiced consumers would first buy products produced
4
by blacks, and the relevant market coefficient would reflect the tastes of the marginal consumer choosing between
products produced by blacks and whites. Borjas and Bronars (1989) also present a model of consumer
discrimination with a fixed discrimination coefficient among white customers, but with imperfect information
about product prices and race of the seller that generates a distribution of product prices in equilibrium and
differential selection by race into self-employment.
We thank Carl Davidson for his assistance in generating this model.
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III. A MODEL OF CONSUMER DISCRIMINATION
In Becker’s (1971) original discussion of consumer discrimination, blacks and whites produce
goods separately in a competitive product market. The price of goods produced by the former, as well as
their wages, are simply reduced by amounts proportional to the relevant “discrimination coefficient” among
consumers.
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We present a much more general model of such discrimination, where employers choose the racial
composition of their workforce in response to the prejudices of their customers.  Unlike Becker, we do not
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assume complete segregation of the workforce or perfect competition in the product market, though either
of these might be considered special cases of our model. In addition to the prejudices of white customers,
we also allow for the possibility that prejudice against workers of another minority group (or in favor of
their own group) might exist among minority customers.
We assume that there are two racial groups, whites and blacks (denoted by W and B). Firms face
separate product demand functions between the two groups of consumers, and must hire from among the
two types of workers. Each group prefers to buy from workers of their own racial group. For simplicity, we
assume that workers from each group are equally productive, and each produce one unit of output per
period.
A firm’s profits in any period can be represented by:
 = P[Q (P,r)+Q (P,r)] - E r(Q +Q ) - E (1-r)(Q +Q ) (1)  W B B W B W W B5
Despite the equal productivities of white and black workers, marketwide wage differentials between them
6
might exist due to discrimination. Since the labor market is competitive, any firm takes these wages as given when
determining its own hiring.
This can be easily demonstrated if, for example, we assume a demand function for each group that is
7
linear in the log of output with respect to r. Then dQ/dr for each group is proportional to the quantity of output
consumed by each.
Implicitly, the model assumes perfectly elastic supplies of white and black labor to all firms; thus, any
8
racial disparities in hiring are caused by the hiring choices of employers. If the model allowed for the relative
supplies of labor to depend on a firm’s location (due to commuting costs, for instance), the degree of workforce
segregation will be even greater.
where P and Q represent price and output respectively, r represents the fraction of the firm’s workforce that
is black, and E  and E  represent the wages of whites and blacks respectively. The demand function is W B
shifted by r—positively for black consumers and negatively for white customers, that is, dQ /dr<0 and W
dQ /dr>0. B
Differentiating Equation (1) with respect to P and r yields the following first-order conditions:
Q +Q  + [P-rE -(1-r)E ][ Q / P +  Q / P] = 0 (2) W B B W W B
(E -E )(Q +Q ) + [P-rE -(1-r)E ]( Q / r +  Q / r) = 0 (3) W B W B B W W B
Equation (2) is a variant of the usual profit-maximizing condition for monopolistic sellers (in
which marginal revenue is equated with marginal cost). The second term of Equation (3) implies that the
firm equates the marginal revenue and cost associated with hiring blacks, while the first term allows for the
possibility that higher wages among whites will lead the firm to substitute black for white workers.
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By totally differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to P and r and then solving
simultaneously, it can be shown that r is a negative function of Q  and a positive function of Q . Thus, W B
anything which raises the former relative to the latter will tend to reduce the presence of blacks in the firm’s
workforce.  For instance, if the firm is located within a predominantly white residential neighborhood (and
7
therefore has a predominantly white clientele), blacks should be a smaller proportion of the firm’s
workforce. Of course, the reverse would be true if the firm is located within a predominantly black
neighborhood.  A tendency for firms to relocate over time away from black areas towards white areas
86
For some economic analysis of the costs of residential segregation to blacks see Yinger (1995). Consistent
9
with our analysis, Cutler and Glaeser (1995) point out that there could be both costs and benefits to specific ethnic
groups from segregation, though their empirical estimates suggest that the costs to blacks clearly outweigh the
benefits. The possibility that residential integration might actually reduce job prospects for blacks was also pointed
out by Offner and Saks (1971).
For instance, the consumers of one group may not mind a limited presence of the other group in shops
10
that they frequent, but they become more uncomfortable when that presence rises above a certain level. Under these
circumstances, the degree of workforce integration that we observe should be limited. If the effects of employee
race in each group’s product demand function are constant, and if no other factors differentially affect relative
product demand between the two groups, then workforce integration should occur commensurate with residential
integration, and the latter will not impede employment prospects of minorities.
This notion could be incorporated into the model by allowing product demand for each racial group to be
11
functions of r, and for some particular occupation groups j, rather than r more generally.  j
would therefore tend to reduce the relative demand for black labor, as the “spatial mismatch” hypothesis
implies.
In the presence of a high degree of residential segregation, we might find corner solutions in which
the workforces of firms are completely segregated, as in Becker; but other costs and legal constraints might
limit the extent to which such workforce segregation is desirable or possible.  Even with comparable
9
numbers of white and black customers, the relatively higher incomes of white customers might imply a
greater presence of white workers among firms in racially mixed neighborhoods; the employment benefits
associated with residential integration for blacks might therefore be limited. Other characteristics of the two
demand functions, such as potential nonlinearities with respect to the presence of black workers, will also
determine the extent to which residential integration improves the employment prospects of blacks.
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The above theoretical model, while simplistic, is useful in various respects. First, it provides some
justification for the empirical specification that we use below; namely, the fractions of a firm’s employees
that are black and Hispanic are functions of the percentages of the firm’s customers who are black and
Hispanic. Second, the theory could easily be extended to incorporate the notion that the racial composition
of the firm’s customers may have differential effects depending on the tasks performed by workers or the
occupational category in which they work.  The latter follows from the idea that consumers may be less
117
For analysis of data from another survey of firms drawn from SSI samples of employers see Barron,
12
Black, and Berger 1994. The household and employer surveys in the four metropolitan areas are part of the Multi-
City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) funded by the Ford and Russell Sage Foundations.
Sample weights are still necessary when analyzing summary data, to adjust for the deliberate
13
underrepresentation of jobs requiring college in the sample as well as for various characteristics of the household
samples that generated some of the firms.
Since SSI provided data on industry, location, and establishment size for all firms, we could test for
14
differences in response rates across these observable dimensions. We found only small and/or insignificant
prejudiced against workers of the nonpreferred group if these workers do not hold higher-status jobs or jobs
involving direct contact with customers.
IV. DATA AND ESTIMATION ISSUES
The data used in this paper are drawn from a new survey of employers that was administered
between June 1992 and May 1994 to over 3,000 employers in four large metropolitan areas: Atlanta,
Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles. The survey was administered over the phone to individuals responsible
for hiring, and focused on the characteristics of overall employees, vacant jobs, and the most recently filled
job and hired worker at each establishment. Other characteristics of the establishment, such as its size,
presence of collective bargaining, and the demographic composition of its applicants and customers, were
gauged as well.
The sample of firms surveyed was drawn from two sources: roughly 30 percent were generated by
employees who were respondents in a household survey in the same four metropolitan areas; and the rest
were generated by lists provided by Survey Sampling Inc. (SSI).  The latter sample was stratified ex ante
12
to reflect the distribution of workers across establishment sizes in the labor force; while the former sample
implicitly reflects this distribution. Both samples are therefore weighted by employee size, permitting
analysis of either individual jobs (such as the one most recently filled) at these firms or overall
employment.  Response rates to the survey among firms that passed the screening averaged 67 percent,
13
and there is little evidence of selection bias induced by nonrandom response patterns in the data.
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differences in most cases. The distributions of our establishments across industries and size categories are quite
comparable to those found in County Business Patterns data in the same areas, and occupational distributions are
also comparable to those found in the 1990 Census of Populations. For more information see Holzer (1996b).
We do not distinguish between whites and Asians in any of this work, since we found little evidence of
15
customer composition effects on employment across these two groups.
Racial composition of the workforce is defined only for the noncollege employees of each establishment,
16
though these constitute roughly 90 percent of the unweighted new hires as well.
The estimated equations that we present below are generally of the following form:
R  =  + CUS + X+ X + (4) jk jk j k jk
W  =  + CUS + X+ X + X+ (5) ijk jk j k i ijk
where R denotes race (white, black, or Hispanic) of hired workers and W denotes the log of the starting
wage; CUS represents variables for the percentages of the firm’s customers who are black and Hispanic;
the X reflect a variety of control variables; and i, j, and k denote the last worker hired, the last job filled,
and the firm (or establishment) respectively.
CUS is measured by responses to the survey questions, “What percentage of the customers at your
firm are _____?”, where the question was asked repeatedly for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians.  We
15
analyze the effects of the racial composition of customers on the race of employees through two different
versions of Equation (4): one in which the dependent variable is the fraction of black or Hispanic workers
at the establishment,  and another in which the dependent variable is the race of the last worker hired. The
16
X variables are omitted from the former set of equations.  j
While the equations for the racial composition of employees are more consistent with the
theoretical model presented above, those for the last worker hired have a number of advantages. First, the
X variables can be used to control more fully for job characteristics (such as skill requirements) that might j
be correlated with both race of customers and employees; thus, estimates using this variable are less likely
to be plagued by bias from unobserved heterogeneity across firms and jobs. Second, the model above9
If the racial composition of customers and the hiring process are time-invariant, there should be no
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essential difference between the two sets of estimates (except for the possible effects of the job-specific control
variables). To the extent that there is variance over time in these measures, the race of the last hired worker would
be the more appropriate measure conceptually, as it shows the effect of the current composition of customers on
current hiring. The correlation of the two employment measures for blacks is roughly 0.6, potentially indicating
some time variance in the employment process.
For more evidence on these variables and their effects on employment outcomes see Holzer (1996a,
18
1996b).
implies that the race of customers is likely to be endogenous with respect to the racial composition of
employees, but this should be much less true with respect to the last hired worker in the establishment.
17
In some versions of Equation (4), we allow for separate effects of customer composition on white,
black, and Hispanic employees; in these cases, variables measuring percentage black customers and
percentage Hispanic customers are included among the independent variables to allow for cross-group as
well as own-group effects. Other equations focus only on blacks versus nonblacks among customers and
employees. The customer variables are alternatively entered in continuous and categorical form (e.g., 0–25
percent, 26–50 percent, etc.) in all estimated equations, where the latter are used to capture non-linearities
in the customer composition effects.
One of the most attractive aspects of our data is that a wide range of controls are included among
the X and X  variables. The X include 1-digit occupation dummies and a variety of dummy variables for j k j
the hiring requirements of jobs and the cognitive/social tasks performed on these jobs—e.g., whether high
school and/or college degrees, specific experience, and previous training are required, and whether the job
entails daily performance of reading/writing, arithmetic, or computer use.  The X  include 1-digit industry,
18
k
establishment size, presence of collective bargaining, and geographic location both between and within the
various metropolitan areas. Along with the X and X  variables, the wage equations also include the X j k i
controls for the personal characteristics of those hired: educational attainment, age, and gender.
The controls for firm location within the MSA are particularly important, since intrametropolitan
location is expected to be highly correlated with both customer composition and the presence of minorities10
This distance is measured as a weighted average of the distances from the census tract in which the
19
establishment is located to every other census tract in the area, where the weights are the percentages of the area’s
blacks or Hispanics that are located in each of the other tracts.
These locational variables might conceivably have served as instruments for the customer variables in
equations for the racial composition of all employees at the firm. However, it seems unlikely that they would be
uncorrelated with the error term in these equations, since establishment location appears to be correlated with
discrimination on the part of the employer. This might occur either because discriminatory employers  choose to
locate away from minority populations (Mieszkowski and Mills 1993), because proximity to minorities might raise
employer concern about legal actions by minority applicants (Bloch 1994), or because proximity to minorities
reduces negative stereotypes by the employer. For evidence on these issues see Holzer 1996b and Holzer and
Ihlanfeldt 1996.
The racial composition of applicants to a firm might well reflect the racial preferences of the firm and its
20
customers, since most job search models posit that expected employment outcomes influence how much or where
workers search for jobs (e.g., Holzer 1988; Holzer, Katz, and Krueger 1991); in other words, the  supply of workers
to a firm adjusts to attributes of demand. The race of the person responsible for hiring might reflect previous hiring
patterns, caused in part by customer preferences.
in the pool of labor facing the firm. We therefore include several variables to measure this location: a
dummy for whether the establishment is located within the central city; a set of dummies for being within a
quarter- or half-mile of a public transit stop; and, most importantly, the distance of the establishment to the
locations of the white, black, and Hispanic residents in the metro area.
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To more fully control for the supply of minority labor to any particular establishment, we can
include controls for the fractions of the establishment’s job applicants who are black and Hispanic. We can
also include the race of the survey respondent (who was responsible for hiring at the establishment), to
control for possible employer prejudice in hiring that might exist independently of customer discrimination
effects. But both of these variables might themselves be functions of the racial composition of customers,
and both, along with the race of customers, might simply reflect the geographic location of the
establishment within the metropolitan area.  Therefore, results are presented for three specifications of
20
each equation: one without any controls for location within the metro area or race of applicants and
respondents (but with controls for job and firm characteristics more generally); one that adds controls for
location; and one that also adds controls for race of applicants and respondents. These different estimates
are provided in an attempt to identify the lower and upper bounds to the true ones.11
There are some additional sources of variation in the effects of customer preferences that we also
wanted to capture here. For instance, the role of customer preferences in hiring is expected to be smaller in
jobs where employees have little direct contact with customers; this may also be true in lower-status
jobs—that is, customers may object less to seeing the nonpreferred group in blue-collar or service jobs in
comparison to higher-level positions. Also, it may be the prejudices of minority customers that drive
employment outcomes, in addition to (or instead of) those of whites.
To deal with the possibility that customer racial preferences may be relatively more important in
some jobs than others, estimates are provided from equations in which we interact race of customers with a
set of occupation dummies, and also (in some equations) a variable for whether or not the job involves face-
to-face contact with customers. Under the assumption that some of these jobs, such as those that do not
involve contact, are subject to little or no customer discrimination, we can generate “difference-in-
difference” estimates of the effects of customer composition—that is, estimates of the differences between
effects for jobs that do and do not involve direct customer contact. Under certain assumptions, these
estimates will be largely purged of unobserved heterogeneity across firms and/or jobs. 
The interactions between the direct contact variables and the categorical measures of customer
racial composition (which define firms as having predominantly white, predominantly black, or racially




Table 1 presents summary data on the racial composition of customers in each of the four
metropolitan areas. The data include means (and standard deviations) on the percentages of each
establishment’s customers who are black or Hispanic. Also reported are the distributions of establishments
across quartile categories of black and Hispanic customers. The data are presented for all firms and12
The “suburbs” here include all areas outside of the primary central city in each metro area, such as other
21
central cities (e.g., Pontiac and Dearborn in the Detroit MSA, Marietta in the Atlanta MSA, and Cambridge and
others in Boston) and heavily black residential areas outside of the central cities. When the latter are omitted from
suburban areas, the percentages of black customers in the suburbs declines from 16 percent to just under 15
percent.
For instance, blacks and Hispanics constitute an (unweighted) average of roughly 17 percent and 12
22
percent of the respective populations in these four metro areas.
separately by central city/suburbs for the full sample and for each MSA. All means and tabulations are
sample-weighted.
The results show that blacks and Hispanics constitute approximately 18 percent and 14 percent,
respectively, of the customers in the full sample of establishments. Thus, a strong majority (over two-
thirds) of the customers in these firms are white. Indeed, blacks constitute a fourth or fewer of all
customers in over 70 percent of the establishments, while the comparable number for Hispanics is over 80
percent.
 Percentages of black customers are somewhat higher in Atlanta and Detroit than in Boston and
Los Angeles, while the opposite is true for Hispanics. Black customers are also more heavily concentrated
in firms located in the central cities than in the suburbs.  All of these characteristics strongly parallel the
21
presence of blacks and Hispanics in the relevant residential populations for these areas.  But, even in the
22
central cities, blacks are the majority of customers in just 16 percent of all establishments (a figure that
rises to 44 percent in central-city Detroit). The comparable figure for Hispanics is 10 percent (and 22
percent in Los Angeles).TABLE 1
Racial Composition of Customers: Summary Statistics
     All Four MSAs                 Atlanta                         Boston                        Detroit                     Los Angeles       
TOT CC SUB TOT CC SUB TOT CC SUB TOT CC SUB TOT CC SUB
Blacks
Mean .183 .231 .165 .259 .321 .236 .132 .215 .114 .216 .395 .181 .136 .142 .132
(S.D.) (.214) (.239) (.198) (.238) (.268) (.219) (.169) (.214) (.148) (.247) (.263) (.225) (.162) (.157) (.165)
Distribution
 .01–.25 .716 .613 .753 .549 .473 .577 .826 .628 .869 .659 .390 .705 .814 .748 .859
 .26–.50 .184 .227 .164 .278 .273 .280 .115 .214 .093 .192 .171 .196 .151 .213 .109
 .51–.75 .069 .097 .058 .119 .141 .111 .049 .115 .034 .089 .209 .069 .024 .035 .017
 .76–1.00 .031 .064 .020 .054 .113 .032 .011 .043 .004 .059 .229 .030 .011 .003 .015
Hispanics
Mean .135 .177 .120 .057 .051 .060 .093 .123 .086 .044 .056 .042 .305 .310 .302
(S.D.) (.215) (.251) (.195) (.071) (.070) (.071) (.138) (.133) (.139) (.066) (.054) (.069) (.303) (.336) (.277)
Distribution
.01–.25 .809 .736 .835 .963 .960 .964 .908 .855 .919 .976 .949 .981 .467 .493 .448
.26–.50 .125 .161 .112 .034 .035 .034 .071 .121 .061 .020 .051 .015 .326 .286 .353
.51–.75 .031 .032 .030 .003 .005 .002 .008 .009 .008 .003 .000 .004 .096 .067 .116
.76–1.00 .035 .070 .023 .000 .000 .000 .013 .016 .013 .000 .000 .000 .112 .154 .083
Note: All means are sample-weighted. “CC” and “SUB” refer to firms located in the central city and suburbs of each metropolitan area, respectively.14
Estimated customer composition effects are generally a bit larger using the Tobit model than those
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estimated by OLS, though qualitatively the two sets of results are virtually identical.
As the theoretical model above suggests, the predominance of white customers in the vast majority
of establishments accounting for new employment could lead to major negative effects on the employment
or earnings of minority workers. Even if the preferences of minority consumers are as strong as those of
whites, the relatively small number of establishments that have majorities of customers who are black or
Hispanic implies that whites may be less disadvantaged by consumer discrimination than minority groups.
Estimated Equations for Race of Employees and Last Hired Worker
Tables 2 and 3 present results from estimated versions of Equation (4) for the race of employees
hired at these establishments as functions of the racial composition of customers. In Table 2, the results are
from equations in which the dependent variable is either the percentage of employees who are black or
those who are Hispanic; the equations are estimated using the Tobit functional form.  Table 3 reports the
23
estimated effects of customer racial composition on the probability that the last hired worker was black,
Hispanic, or white (reference group) obtained from multinomial logit equations.
The results from equations in which the percentages of customers who are black or Hispanic enter
in continuous form are reported at the top of each of these tables, while the results with the quartile
dummies appear at the bottom. One column of estimates is presented for each of the three specifications
described above—that is, Column 1 omits controls for location within the MSA and race of applicants and
respondents; Column 2 includes controls for location within the MSA; and Column 3 includes all of these
variables. Underneath each of the estimated logit coefficients is the standard error (in parentheses) and
partial derivative evaluated at the sample means (in brackets). Controls for other establishment
characteristics are included in all three specifications, as are controls for characteristics of jobs in the
results reported in Table 3.15
TABLE 2
Effects of Customer Composition on Race of Employees: Tobit Estimates
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
                   Blacks                                          Hispanics                   
1 2 3 1 2 3
Percent Customers
Black .0077 .0064 .0031 -.0003 -.0007 -.0002
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
Hispanic -.0016 -.0015 -.0003 .0056 .0055 .0023
(.0005) (.0005) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
-Log L 572.25 512.02 300.58 448.35 426.48 234.76
Percent Black
 .26–.50 .166 .127 .066 .006 -.001 .007
(.018) (.018) (.016) (.018) (.018) (.015)
.51–.75 .326 .251 .109 .020 .002 .009
(.024) (.024) (.022) (.024) (.025) (.022)
.76–1.00 .600 .492 .233 -.007 -.036 -.008
(.030) (.030) (.029) (.033) (.034) (.030)
Percent Hispanic
 .26–.50 -.038 -.028 -.016 .089 .083 .029
(.025) (.024) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.018)
.51–.75 -.048 -.043 -.018 .222 .208 .086
(.042) (.040) (.036) (.034) (.034) (.029)
.76–1.00 -.103 -.111 .014 .466 .447 .170
(.049) (.047) (.044) (.039) (.039) (.035)
 -Log L 606.10 537.29 308.39 462.28 440.81 240.85
Note: Sample size is 1922. Column 1 estimates include controls for MSA, industry, and establishment size.
Column 2 equations also include controls for location with the MSA, while Column 3 includes these
variables plus race of applicants and survey respondent.16
TABLE 3
Effects of Customer Composition on Race of Last Hire: Multinomial Logit Estimates
                   Blacks                                          Hispanics                   
1 2 3 1 2 3
Percent Customers
Black .045 .037 .024 .001 -.000 -.002
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.006)
[.006] [.005] [.003] [-.001] [-.001] [-.001]
Hispanic -.009 -.007 -.009 .026 .025 .013
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.005)
[-.002] [-.002] [-.002] [.004] [.003] [.002]
Percent Black
.26–.50 1.049 .833 .564 .161 .122 .126
(.164) (.170) (.180) (.225) (.230) (.239)
[.143] [.114] [.076] [-.006] [-.006] [.002]
.51–.75 1.933 1.541 .943 .038 -.055 -.211
(.204) (.215) (.231) (.395) (.405) (.428)
[.270] [.218] [.138] [-.045] [-.047] [-.052]
.76 –1.00 3.428 2.790 .743 .475 .210 -.214
(.304) (.313) (.344) (.744) (.783) (.786)
[.469] [.386] [.250] [-.027] [-.045] [-.073]
Percent Hispanic
.26–.50 -.211 -.175 -.244 .569 .561 .286
(.254) (.260) (.276) (.220) (.225) (.237)
[-.044] [-.039] [-.042] [.079] [.077] [.043]
.51–.75 -.233 -.236 -.413 .931 .828 .272
(.477) (.485) (.516) (.328) (.336) (.358)
[-.057] [-.055] [-.065] [.127] [.113] [.046]
.76–1.00 -.044 .019 .139 2.172 2.095 .955
(.859) (.852) (.936) (.437) (.452) (.502)
[-.062] [-.052] [-.005] [.283] [.271] [.120]
Note: Estimated partial derivatives evaluated at sample means are in brackets. Columns are defined as in
the previous table, except that all equations also include controls for job-specific skill needs and occupation
dummies.17
The correlations between race of customers and the distance of the firm to the residential locations of
24
each group are roughly 0.2 to 0.3, thereby indicating a good deal of independent variation between the two.
Correlations between the racial composition of customers, applicants, and race of respondent are generally 0.5 to
0.6.
Since the customer composition variables are undoubtedly measured with some error, the estimates
presented in Tables 2 and 3 likely understate the true effects of these variables.
Comparing the partial derivatives of Table 3 to the coefficient estimates of Table 2, we find that the
25
latter are generally larger for the first specification but not for the third.
The sample-weighted fractions of all new jobs filled by blacks and Hispanics are 0.169 and 0.153
26
respectively, with standard deviations of 0.409 and 0.393.
The results of Tables 2 and 3 show that the presence of black or Hispanic customers at an
establishment has significant positive effects on the hiring of employees from these groups. The magnitudes
of these effects are somewhat reduced when controls are added for location and decline even more when the
other racial variables are included, but the effects generally remain statistically significant.  Effects
24
estimated for blacks are generally larger than those estimated for Hispanics, suggesting either a stronger
antipathy among white customers for the former or a stronger preference among black customers for
employees of their own race.
The partial derivatives evaluated at sample means indicate that a twenty-percentage point (or
roughly one standard-deviation) increase in the fraction of customers who are black increases the
probability that blacks will be hired by 6–12 percentage points in Table 3 (or 15–30 percent of a standard
deviation), and 6–15 points in Table 2.  For Hispanics, the comparable effects would be 4–8 percentage
25
points.  Furthermore, while the own-group effects are all positive, the cross-group effects between blacks
26
and Hispanics are generally negative but not significant. The results thus suggest that customers from each
group prefer employees of their own group to those from other groups, while both blacks and Hispanics do
not appreciably distinguish the other minority group from whites.
The estimates using the quartile categories for racial composition of customers as independent
variables also show that effects of customer racial composition rise monotonically for both blacks and
Hispanics, with employment probabilities being significantly higher than for the omitted group (that is,18
The same survey question for race of customers was asked of all establishments. For wholesale trade and
27
manufacturing firms, this question likely refers to those individuals at other companies (including proprietors) who
work as purchasers.
More details on all of these estimates are available from the authors.
28
customers who are no more that one-fourth black or Hispanic) in each category. The results also suggest
some non-linearity in these effects—specifically, the probability of hiring each minority group rises
substantially at establishments where the group’s customers constitute three-fourths or more of the total.
Although not reported for reasons of space, separate estimates were also generated for particular
subsets of the sample. First, the sample was stratified by whether or not the firm is part of the retail trade
sector. Results did not differ significantly between the retail trade and other sectors, even though the
customers in the former sector are more likely to be private consumers rather than the owners or employees
of other businesses.  Second, separate estimates by gender reveal that the racial composition of customers
27
has somewhat larger effects on the hiring of black and Hispanic females than their male counterparts,
which may reflect the greater tendency of females to be found in jobs with direct customer contact. Finally,
separate equations were estimated for each of the four metro areas. Estimated customer composition effects
are highly similar across these areas.
28
Effects by Occupation and Customer Contact
The extent to which consumers prefer dealing with employees who are members of their own racial
group should matter more in some kinds of jobs than in others. For instance, white customers may not mind
dealing with blacks in a low-status occupation, such as the service category. It also seems plausible that the
racial composition of customers will matter more for hiring into jobs that involve direct contact with
customers.
This section therefore presents estimated effects of customer racial composition interacted with
occupation and/or whether the most recently filled job in the firm involves direct contact with customers.
The customer contact variable is based on a survey question for how frequently individuals in the job “talk19
A separate question was asked for those who talked over the phone. When we allow our variable to
29
include this type of contact, results are fairly similar to those reported in Table 4 (since the two contact variables
are quite highly correlated). These survey questions inquired whether each type of contact occurred at least daily,
weekly, monthly, or not at all. Most responses fell in the first or last of these categories; thus, estimates changed
very little when we redefined the contact variable as daily versus all other categories.
The top two quartiles of the customer variable have been combined to maintain sample size.
30
Since over 95 percent of the sales jobs involve direct customer contact, we include all sales jobs in the
31
contact category. We also combine other white-collar jobs into a single category, since so few of these other white-
collar jobs involve no customer contact.
face-to-face with customers or clients”; we define a dummy variable which equals one when jobs involve at
least some customer contact and zero otherwise.
29
Table 4 presents estimates from equations in which this variable and/or occupation are interacted
with the categorical version of percentage black customers.  In part A of the table, we present coefficients
30
on interactions between customer categories and five occupation dummies, while in part B the interactions
are with both occupational category and the dummy variable for customer contact. In both cases, the
coefficients presented are on dummies for two-way or three-way “cells” (that is, percentage black-by-
occupation or percentage black-by-contact-by-occupation) and sales jobs in predominantly white areas is
used as the reference category.
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We present results from two estimated equations, corresponding to the first and third specifications
used in Tables 2 and 3 (that is, omitting or including within-MSA location and other racial characteristics
of the establishment). Cell sizes for the interactions are too small to separately consider Hispanics in the
analysis. Results are therefore presented from estimated binomial logit equations where the dependent
variable is one if a black is hired and zero otherwise.
The results of part A of Table 4 show that there are differences in the probabilities of hiring blacks
across the occupational categories within each racial category of customers; there are also differences
across racial categories within occupations. Regarding the first set of differences, within the20
TABLE 4
Effects of Black Customers on the Hiring of Blacks:
Separate Effects by Occupation and/or Customer Contact
(Binomial Logit Estimates)
     .00–.25           .26–.50           .51–1.00     
Percentage Black Customers 1 2 1 2 1 2
A. By Occupation
Occupation
Sales — — 1.657 1.375 3.277 1.682
(.479) (.523) (.484) (.546)
[—] [—] [.261] [.193] [.460] [.236]
Prof./Manag. .684 .691 1.803 1.233 2.949 2.085
(.460) (.482) (.498) (.507) (.510) (.521)
  [.096] [.097] [.253] [.173] [.414] [.293]
Clerical .643 .694 1.677 1.145 2.937 1.847
(.475) (.457) (.459) (.485) (.489) (.519)
[.090] [.097] [.236] [.161] [.412] [.259]
Service 1.403 1.324 2.252 1.603 3.627 2.464
(.448) (.475) (.476) (.511) (.497) (.528)
[.197] [.186] [.316] [.225] [.509] [.346]
Blue-Collar 1.125 1.148 1.450 1.254 2.537 1.342
(.443) (.467) (.506) (.540) (.530) (.571)
[.158] [.161] [.204] [.176] [.356] [.188]
B. By Occupation and Customer Contact
Contact
Sales — — 1.673 1.249 3.288 2.108
(.480) (.507) (.485) (.521)
[—] [—] [.235] [.175] [.462] [.296]
Other White-Collar .618 .673 1.530 1.063 3.030 1.776
(.427) (.448) (.450) (.472) (.461) (.491)
  [.087] [.095] [.215] [.149] [.426] [.249]
Blue-Collar 1.116 1.190 1.576 1.460 2.789 1.506
(.461) (.485) (.571) (.607) (.574) (.618)
[.157] [.167] [.221] [.205] [.392] [.212]
Service 1.335 1.291 2.445 1.809 3.710 2.489
(.458) (.486) (.489) (.527) (.510) (.542)
[.187] [.181] [.343] [.254] [.521] [.350]
(table continues)21
TABLE 4, continued
     .00–.25           .26–.50           .51–1.00     
Percentage Black Customers 1 2 1 2 1 2
No Contact
Other White-Collar .683 .571 2.273 1.681 2.390 1.565
(.485) (.511) (.541) (.583) (.626) (.665)
[.096] [.080] [.319]  [.236] [.336] [.220]
Blue-Collar 1.019 .888 1.204 .833 1.746 .710
(.497) (.527) (.618) (.671) (.796) (.856)
[.143] [.125] [.169] [.117] [.245] [.100]
Service 1.502 1.212 1.297 .525 2.830 2.006
(.577) (.623) (.745) (.820) (.927) (1.057)
[.211] [.170] [.182] [.074] [.397] [.282]
C. Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Implied Partial Derivatives
Sales -.096 -.080 -.084 -.061 .126 .076
Other White-Collar -.009 .015 -.104 -.087 .090 .029
Blue-Collar .014 .042 .052 .088 .147 .112
Service -.024 .011 .161 .180 .124 .068
Note: Column 2 in this table corresponds to Column 3 in Tables 2 and 3.22
The extent to which sales jobs are higher in status will, of course, vary a great deal by the nature of the
32
establishment and the product being sold.
predominantly nonblack customer category, fewer blacks are hired into sales jobs than any other category
(though the differences between sales and other white-collar jobs are just marginally significant), and fewer
are hired into any white-collar job than into service or blue-collar jobs. In contrast, blacks are more
frequently hired into sales or service positions than into other jobs in firms with predominantly black
customers.
The tendency of blacks to obtain other white-collar jobs less frequently than nonblacks at
establishments with predominantly white customers may reflect higher skill requirements in those jobs,
despite our inclusion of numerous controls for these requirements. But the lower hiring of blacks into sales
jobs, even relative to other white-collar positions, is unlikely to reflect higher skill requirements; more
likely, it reflects a greater aversion on the part of white customers to dealing with blacks in a relative
higher-status job category where customer contact is particularly frequent or intensive. Likewise, the
finding that blacks are more likely to be hired into sales and especially service jobs than into blue-collar
jobs in firms with predominantly black customers may indicate a similar preference for contact with their
own racial group.
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Regarding differences in probabilities across customer categories within occupational groups, the
probability of hiring blacks increases within each occupational group as the percentage of customers who
are black rises. But, as was suggested by the differences in probabilities across occupations within
customer categories, the effect of black customers on hiring is highest in sales occupations and smallest in
blue-collar occupations.
Of course, it is possible that the results presented in part A of Table 4 are driven by unobserved
factors on the demand side of the labor market, such as differences in skill needs or other sources of
employer discrimination. It is also possible that they are driven by labor supply behavior rather than23
demand. Even though we control for the racial composition of job applicants in the second specification,
the control is at the level of the firm, and may not capture racial differences in job application rates across
jobs within firms. A logical response by blacks to discriminatory barriers at jobs in predominantly white
firms (whether or not they involve customer contact) might be to apply heavily to jobs at predominantly
black firms. Furthermore, whites may be more uncomfortable in jobs at predominantly black firms, which
may affect their willingness to apply to these firms.
A comparison of the estimated effects on employment between jobs in the same occupation that do
and do not involve contact with customers (in part B of Table 4) provides a way of dealing with
unobserved heterogeneity across firms and jobs. If we assume that any effects of customer composition on
hiring in noncontact jobs reflects only unobserved heterogeneity, then the difference between the estimated
effects in contact and noncontact jobs within the same occupation yield an unbiased estimate of the effect
of customer racial composition in that occupation. In other words, this would generate a difference-in-
differences estimate, which would eliminate unobserved factors that are correlated with customer
composition and that are fixed by occupation.
An additional advantage to this approach is that, given our categorical racial customer variable, we
can generate estimates separately for firms with few and many black customers. If we think of the
noncontact jobs in each occupation and customer category as representing the “base” level of black
employment for that category in the absence of customer prejudice, then our difference-in-differences
estimates can be interpreted as separate measures of discrimination among white and black customers.
Negative differences (when subtracting effects on black employment in noncontact from contact jobs)
where customers are predominantly white would be considered prejudice among whites, while positive
differences where customers are predominantly black would reflect prejudice among blacks.
The estimated coefficients (along with standard errors and implied partials) appear in part B of
Table 4, while the difference-in-differences estimates of implied partial derivatives evaluated at the sample24
Given that the logit coefficients themselves are from nonlinear estimated functions, the differences are
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only meaningful with regard to implied partial derivatives.
If, for instance, blacks feel relatively more comfortable applying for jobs without customer contact in
34
firms with mostly white customers and with contact in firms with mostly black customers, even within occupation,
then the difference-in-difference estimates would still contain some upward bias. But we know of no evidence that
this is, in fact, the case.
means appear in part C.  The results suggest that there is some prejudice among both black and nonblack
33
customers. In firms with few black customers, there is little difference between the employment of blacks in
contact and noncontact jobs within most occupations; but the differences between occupations, especially
sales versus other categories, remain clear. Since, by definition, the sales jobs are all considered “contact”
jobs, we compare them to other white-collar jobs in the noncontact category when computing the
difference-in-difference estimates of partials; these estimates show clear evidence of discrimination among
white customers against blacks in sales jobs, though little elsewhere.
In contrast, blacks are relatively more likely to be employed in jobs involving customer contact
than in those that do not, even within occupation, in firms with many black customers, and this holds true
within each occupational category. Thus, customer prejudice in favor of black employees seems quite
widely prevalent in these firms. Results for firms with racially mixed customers vary across occupations,
suggesting some discrimination against blacks in white-collar jobs and in favor of blacks in blue-collar or
service jobs.
Of course, the difference-in-differences estimates are unbiased only to the extent that the
unobserved factors that are correlated with race of customers are fixed within occupation and don’t vary
systematically between contact and noncontact jobs.  On the other hand, these estimates also assume that
34
there is no customer prejudice in the noncontact jobs. But workers hired into such jobs might still be visible
to customers, even if they have no contact with them, and, if employees can be promoted over time from
noncontact to contact jobs, customer preferences might influence hiring into entry-level, noncontact jobs as25
The interpretation of these weighted estimates as relative demand shifts is based on the assumptions that
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unobserved relative supply shifts as well as wage levels across jobs are uncorrelated with customer composition.
We test the latter assumption below. 
well. Thus, the difference in estimates between contact and noncontact jobs might actually generate lower
bounds to the true customer effects.
Net Effects on Labor Demand by Race
What do these estimates imply about the overall demand for blacks and whites hired into newly
filled jobs? In particular, do the apparent preferences of nonblack customers for nonblack employees and
those of black customers for black employees offset each other overall, or do these preferences create net
shifts in labor demand in favor of one group or the other? Evidence on this question is provided in Table 5.
Our estimates of net labor demand shifts for blacks are based on the implied partial derivatives of
Table 4. Since these coefficients measure the effects of the racial composition of customers on the race of
who gets hired at firms (controlling for other determinants of relative demand and supply), we can interpret
them as measures of relative demand shifts across racial groups that are generated by customer
preferences. To estimate marketwide shifts in relative demand, we compute weighted averages of the partial
derivatives implied by difference-in-differences estimates of part B in Table 4, where the weights are the
percentages of all newly filled jobs in the relevant job categories.
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Three sets of difference-in-differences estimates are used. In the first two, we use differences
between estimates for contact and noncontact jobs within customer racial category, which appear in part C
of Table 4; the net demand shifts labeled “high” and “low” in Table 5 correspond to estimates from
Columns 1 and 2, respectively, in part C of Table 4. The weights are the percentages of jobs in each racial
category which are contact jobs in the relevant occupation.TABLE 5
Net Effects of Customer Composition on Relative Demand for Blacks: Difference-in-Difference Estimates
       Differencing within Each Customer       Differencing within Each Customer                     Differencing across
                Category: Low Estimate                                 Category: High Estimate                                    Customer Categories             
Percentage Customer Black .00–.25 .26–.50 .51–1.00 TOTAL .00–.25 .26–.50 .51–1.00 TOTAL .00–.25 .26–.50 .51–1.00 TOTAL
Employment effects for each category
 Percentage points .002 -.037 .051 - -.023 -.067 .103 - -.055 .030 .109 -
 Percent of black hires .012 -.219 .302 - -.136 -.396 .609 - -.325 .178 .645 -
Effects weighted by size of category
Percentage points .001 -.005 .002 -.002 -.014 -.009 .004 -.019 -.043 .004 .005 -.034
Percent of black hires .006 -.029 .012 -.011 -.100 -.053 .024 -.129 -.254 .024 .030 -.201
Note: Calculations based on differences across customer categories use differences between partial derivatives in each customer category and those of noncontact jobs in
the middle customer category (i.e., .26–.50 black); only Column 2 estimates from Table 4 are used here. Calculations based on differences within each category use
differences between contact and noncontact jobs within each occupation and customer category; high estimates are from Column 1 and low estimates are from Column 2
in Table 4.27
The difference-in-difference estimates that are used in this third set of calculations do not appear in part
36
C of Table 4, but can be computed from the partials that appear in part B. 
The percentage of employees who are black in the “base” category here is 0.41, which is quite high
37
relative to the sample mean (0.17). We therefore use only the Column 2 estimates in this set of computations,
which include the controls for race of applicants and survey respondent.
These latter weights are 0.74, 0.18, and 0.08, respectively.
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However, as noted above, it is possible that differencing away the effects of customer race in
noncontact jobs within customer categories might lead us to understate the true customer prejudice effect (if
customer preferences have some effect on hiring into these jobs as well). We therefore provide a third set of
estimates in which we compare jobs within occupations across racial customer categories. These estimates
use noncontact jobs in the middle customer racial category (that is, where customers are 26–50 percent
black) as the base group in which customer prejudice presumably plays no role in black employment. The
estimated partial derivatives of black employment for these jobs are subtracted from those in comparable
occupations, both for those with and without contact, in all of the relevant customer racial categories.
36
These differences are then weighted by the percentages of jobs in each racial category that are accounted
for by the relevant occupation-by-contact cell. Since the level of black employment in the base category in
this exercise is quite high, we consider this set of estimates to be upper bounds only to the true net effect of
customer discrimination on labor demand.
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While computing any of the three sets of estimates, the weighting is initially done separately within
each customer racial category. We therefore generate separate estimates of percentage-point demand shifts
within each such category; dividing these by the mean of black employment among new hires (.169)
generates labor demand shifts for or against blacks in percentage terms. Each of these within-category
estimates can then be weighted by the percentages of new hires accounted for by each of the customer
racial categories, which show that most jobs are found in predominantly white firms.  Summing across
38
these estimates then generates the total shifts in demand for black labor that can be attributed to customer
preferences with each method.28
The results of Table 5 suggest that customer discrimination causes a net decline in overall labor
demand facing blacks. However, the estimated magnitude of the decline varies considerably across the three
calculation techniques. The estimates based on differences between contact and noncontact jobs within each
racial category generate marketwide declines of labor demand for blacks in the range of from 1 to 13
percent. The estimate based on differences across racial customer categories (using occupations with high
level of black employment as the “base”) is considerably higher than this (roughly 20 percent).
The data consistently show that preferences among blacks tend to raise the demand for black labor
by substantial amounts in those firms where black customers predominate; but these constitute such a small
fraction of all firms that they raise overall demand for black labor by just 1–3 percent. In firms with few
black customers, the estimated effects on demand for black labor tend to be negative but are very close to
zero in the within-occupation, “low-estimate” case. Estimated effects in the middle racial customer category
(0.26–0.50) vary greatly with calculation technique.
Wage Effects
Although reductions in net demand for black labor should reduce employment and/or wages for
black employees overall, it is also possible that customer discrimination generates wage differences among
blacks (or other groups), depending on where particular employees work.
Table 6 presents the results from estimating several versions of Equation (5). The dependent
variable is the log of the starting hourly wage of the newly hired worker. Separate estimates appear for
blacks and nonblacks; control variables now also include the age, education, and gender of the newly hired
worker. The customer black variable appears in both continuous and categorical form.
The results of four specifications are reported. The first includes only the individual characteristics
(X) of workers, along with the MSA in which their establishment is located. The second through fourth i
specifications correspond to the three included in Tables 2 and 3, except that the X have been added in all i
cases. The different specifications allow for the potential effect of customer preferencesTABLE 6
Effects of Black Customers on Log
(Starting Hourly Wages)
                                          Categorical                                         
             Continuous                           Nonblacks                             Blacks             
Controls Nonblacks Blacks .26–.50 .51–1.00 .26–.50 .51–1.00
1. Age, Education, Gender, MSA -.164 -.263 -.067 -.073 -.127 -.176
(.061) (.062) (.027) (.042) (.043) (.040)
2. Firm Characteristics, Skill Needs, -.067 -.158 -.033 -.023 -.073 -.094
and Occupation added (.055) (.057) (.024) (.037) (.038) (.037)
3. Location within MSA added -.114 -.196 -.043 -.050 -.084 -.112
(.056) (.061) (.024) (.038) (.039) (.040)
4. Race of applicants and  -.122 -.101 -.042 -.052 -.069 -.059
respondent added (.061) (.065) (.025) (.040) (.039) (.041)
Note: Sample size is 442 for blacks and 1420 for non-blacks.30
We estimated some versions of the wage equation using the percentage of all employees at the
39
establishment who are black rather than percentage of applicants, but the latter actually had a larger effect on
wages than the former.
These estimates do not allow for the possibility that the wages of blacks who are hired into firms with
40
predominantly non-black customers might be reduced because they are reallocated from sales to other jobs. But
given the relatively low wages of sales jobs in this sample (paying wages that are only marginally higher than those
in laborer or service jobs in this category), this effect is likely to be very small.
Lower capital-labor ratios or worse technology might be found in predominantly black establishments if
41
the owners of these establishments are less wealthy than those of white establishments; crowding might occur
on the firms in which workers are employed and the jobs which they hold, so that these characteristics are
not fully controlled for in all cases. Controlling for other racial characteristics of firms (in the fourth
specification) also enables us to determine whether or not customer composition per se affects employee
wages, or only affects them indirectly by reallocating blacks into firms with predominantly black workers.
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The results of Table 6 suggest that wages are lower in areas where customers are predominantly
black. This is true for black as well as nonblack employees, though the effects generally are somewhat
larger for the former. Without controlling for any firm or job characteristics, blacks working in firms with
no black customers earn about 26 percent more than those working in firms with only black customers.
Controlling for job and firm characteristics as well as location within the MSA reduces this differential to
16–20 percent, while controlling for other racial characteristics reduces it to about 10 percent. Using the
categorical rather than continuous customer variables shows reductions in wages that are somewhat smaller
than these but they are still highly significant in most cases.
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Why might the wages of workers be reduced in firms with mostly black customers? The theoretical
model of Section III suggests that this should be true only for nonblack employees in these establishments,
who would be facing reduced demand for labor there. Clearly, the lower wages of black as well as nonblack
employees at these establishments suggest that there must be other differences between firms that serve
predominantly black and white customers. These might include lower capital-labor ratios, worse
technology, greater labor market “crowding,” and/or lower product market rents at the predominantly black
firms.
4131
because of any kind of discrimination limiting employment of blacks in the predominantly white establishments
(Bergmann 1971); and lower product market rents might reflect the lower relative incomes of black consumers.
For instance, Hirsch and MacPherson (1994) suggest that the lower wages of blacks in predominantly
42
black occupations largely reflects typically unobserved heterogeneity across workers and/or jobs.
As we note above, the estimated demand shifts in Table 5 suggest that only 1–3 percent of blacks are
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reallocated by customer discrimination towards these firms. Thus, the 10–20 percent lower wages of these
establishments translate into just 0.1–0.6 percent lower wages of blacks overall because of customer discrimination.
While negative wage effects can also be observed on the wages of those employed in the middle group of
customers, the extent to which customer discrimination raises or lowers the employment of blacks in such firms is
very uncertain from Table 5.
Indeed, the fact that some negative effects of having mostly black customers remain even after
controlling for other racial characteristics of the establishments suggests that product market differences
play some role. Alternatively, the lower wages could simply be capturing lower unobserved skills among
the workers who fill the jobs at these establishments.
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Given the relatively small number of firms that have predominantly black customers, and therefore
the small effects of customer discrimination on raising employment there (as observed in Table 5), the low
wages paid in these firms cannot contribute greatly to overall wage differentials between whites and
blacks.  But their effects on the relative wages of those blacks who actually obtain such employment
43
appear to be quite substantial.
Changes Over Time
Earlier it was suggested that the importance of consumer discrimination may be growing over time
as the result of the suburbanization and deindustralization of employment. Given that it is a single cross
section, the MCSUI Employer Survey does not allow for a full investigation of this issue. However, other
data, while not providing direct evidence, suggest that the importance of consumer discrimination might be
growing over time.
Table 7 presents data for Atlanta and Detroit on the percentages of all employment and population
found in residential areas with majority black populations in 1980 and 1990. Unique data are available on
the Atlanta Region that indicate the number of private sector jobs by one-digit industry and year within32
In 1990 the Atlanta Region accounted for 0.83 and 0.92 of the metro area’s people and jobs, respectively.
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each of 45 planning areas called superdistricts. The Atlanta Region includes the city of Atlanta and the
inner suburbs of the metropolitan area.  In 1980, 7 of the 45 superdistricts in Atlanta had majority black
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populations; in 1990, the number of superdistricts with majority black populations included the 7 that
existed in 1980 plus 4 more. For Detroit, similar data (but without the industry breakdown) are available
for 120 political jurisdictions. The same four jurisdictions were majority black in both 1980 and 1990.
Despite the increase in the number of majority black areas over time, the percentage of the Atlanta
Region’s jobs located in these areas declined from 27 percent in 1980 to 19 percent in 1990. Hence, more
of the region’s jobs are now located in places where the racial composition of customers is likely to be
predominately white. Moreover, the industry breakdown shows that the shift in jobs from majority black to
majority white areas has been the greatest in those industries with the largest percentages of jobs involving
consumer contact (such as financial services, utilities, and retail trade). Detroit also experienced a large
decline in the fraction of jobs located in majority black areas, which fell from 31 percent in 1980 to 22
percent in 1990.
While these results are only for two cities, they reflect the forces of job suburbanization and
continuing high levels of residential segregation that characterize most urban areas in the United States. Of
course, the black population is also suburbanizing, even more rapidly nationwide than that of whites
(Farley and Frey 1993). But the data in Table 7 show that, at least in these two metropolitan areas,
employment is declining in predominantly black areas more rapidly than is the population; thus, blacksTABLE 7
Percentage of Metro Area Jobs and Population in Majority Black Districts, 1980 and 1990
Total Constr. Mfg. TCU Wholesale Trade Retail Trade FIRE Service
Employment
A. Atlanta
1980 .27 .21 .31 .41 .26 .23 .26 .27
1990 .19 .19 .29 .32 .21 .17 .15 .20
B. Detroit
1980 .31 — — — — — — —




1980 .23 .73 .08
1990 .17 .65 .06
B. Detroit
1980 .32 .91 .14
1990 .29 .88 .09
Note: These data are based on 45 superdistricts (or planning areas) in Atlanta and 120 political jurisdictions in Detroit.34
If the numbers of jobs and people were leaving the predominantly black areas at the same rate, we would
45
merely be observing increasing residential and employment integration. The implication of rising integration for
relative black employment and earnings in the presence of customer discrimination would be ambiguous, as we
noted in Section III above. Metropolitanwide segregation indices suggest significant increases in racial integration
in Atlanta but not Detroit over this decade, and somewhat modest increases nationwide (Farley and Frey 1993).
It is possible that consumer tastes for discrimination will decline over time with growing integration, as
46
greater exposure of racial groups to one another will diminish negative stereotypes and discomfort felt in the
presence of the other group.
who continue to live in predominantly black areas will find fewer jobs available in establishments where
they are relatively preferred by customers.
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Changes in the mix of industries and jobs over time may also contribute to a growing importance
of customer preferences, as more jobs over time involve some contact with customers. To provide some
evidence on this issue, data from the Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) for each of the four cities
included in the MCSUI Employer Survey were used to cross-tabulate jobs by occupation and industry for
1980 and 1990. To estimate the number of jobs in a particular occupation/industry cell involving consumer
contact, estimates were used from our employer survey data; we then computed weighted averages of these
estimates, weighted by the fraction of all jobs in each year in each occupation-industry cell.
The results of this exercise are found in Table 8. Between 1980 and 1990 in all four cities the
percentage of all jobs involving consumer contact increased by 3 to 7 percentage points, for a 6 percent
increase overall. Of course, this exercise underestimates the true growth of jobs involving customer contact,
since it allows for no growth in these jobs within the occupation-industry cells.
Thus, the effects of a given degree of customer discrimination may be growing over time, as more
jobs involve customer contact and more jobs are located in predominantly white areas. Unless these effects
are offset by rising residential integration or declining consumer tastes for discrimination over time, the
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Los Angeles .67 .70
Source: MCSUI Employers Survey, and 1980 and 1990 PUMS.36
VI. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the racial composition of customers affects who gets hired into a firm.
Specifically, the larger the fraction of minority customers in an establishment, the higher is the probability
that workers from that minority group will be hired. In general, these effects are stronger for blacks than
for Hispanics, and are therefore consistent with the evidence reported in previous studies.
The magnitudes of these effects are found to vary by occupational category and the degree of direct
contact with customers on the job. We find that employers are most reluctant to hire blacks into sales jobs
in establishments where most customers are not black; while employers with predominantly black
customers prefer black employees in all jobs that involve direct contact.
These preferences of white and black customers are found to generate net shifts in labor demand
away from blacks, though much uncertainty remains about the magnitudes of these shifts. The wages of
blacks (and nonblacks) who work in firms with predominantly black customers are also reduced relative to
those who do not. Finally, our data suggest that the importance of customer racial composition may be
growing over time, as jobs move from majority black to majority white areas and as more involve direct
customer contact.
In addition to the various caveats stated above regarding econometric issues, a few more of a
conceptual nature deserve mention. First, our results reflect employers’ perceptions of customer
preferences, and these perceptions may not be accurate. Nevertheless, the exact source of the discrimination
does not change its effects on relative labor market outcomes. Second, it is possible that there are real
differences in the quality of services that customers receive between members of their own racial group and
those of others, if the employees themselves have biases (or even differing levels of comfort). In this case, it
may be inappropriate to label the labor market effects of customer preferences as “discrimination.”37
Despite these caveats, our results suggest that the racial composition of customers has real effects
on relative employment outcomes of whites and blacks. These effects, and how they are changing over time,
certainly merit further study.3839
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